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‘It’s the economy, stupid’, attributed to James Carville, adviser to Bill Clinton 
Background 
Most elections turn on whether or not voters have sufficient confidence that the scoundrels they vote 
into government will at least run the economy well. Even if those in power display the moral or ethical 
shortcomings that cynical citizens have come to expect from their politicians, they will be supported if 
their policies avoid episodes of instability, deliver job creation and increase prosperity. 
Although the EU referendum is not a routine election, there are good reasons to believe that when it 
comes to putting the cross on the ballot paper, the likely economic outcome will still weigh heavily on 
voters’ choices. The trouble is that they have been assailed by studies and projections which offer 
conflicting analyses, making it difficult to judge who is (or is most likely to be) broadly right, who has 
engaged in sloppy research or made implausible assumptions, and who is doing little more than making 
unwarranted assertions.  
Studies have looked at the overall impact of leaving the EU, the implications for jobs and the effects on 
the public finances. International organisations, such as the IMF and the OECD, have contributed to the 
debate, looking both at the impact on the UK, but also at potential risks for the global economy, while 
the Bank of England has stressed its duty to speak up when it identifies risks, in particular, to financial 
stability.  
While some findings provide clear evidence of gains or losses from Brexit, what others reveal is open to 
interpretation and will be welcome by some but regretted by others. The claim from George Osborne, 
the Chancellor of the Exchequer, that house prices will fall, perhaps by as much as 20 percent, may or 
may not be correct, but it will be good news for those unable currently to step on to the housing ladder, 
yet bad for those already well up that ladder. There will be many similar distributive effects, whether in 
relation to income, jobs or other influences on well-being. 
This report draws on some of the main contributions to the debate to arrive at conclusions on what can 
be reasonably relied upon, as opposed to being regarded as either misleading, incomplete or down-
right wrong. The assessment was greatly helped by a ‘brainstorming seminar’ at which economists from 
different backgrounds came together to discuss the strengths and weaknesses of different approaches. 
The findings reported here also reflect discussions at a separate ‘brainstorming seminar’ on the likely 
effects of Brexit on regional economic development. This short overview summarises the main message 




The macroeconomic effects of Brexit: longer term 
 There have been many attempts to model the macroeconomic consequences of Brexit, nearly all of 
which find that there will be a long-term loss of GDP for the UK economy compared with the status 
quo projections of remaining fully in the EU and its single market. 
o It is important to stress that this means lower GDP than would otherwise be the case, not 
an actual fall in prosperity: if, for example, the UK maintained its trend growth rate up to 
2030, the economy would be some 30% larger, and the ‘losses’ envisaged are relative to 
that projection. A loss of 6% would, therefore,  mean 24% growth instead of 30%, but 
would also mean that the UK economy would be smaller indefinitely. 
 The range of estimates is large, from a loss of GDP of nearly ten percentage points (in the least 
attractive trade and inward investment scenarios modelled by the Treasury, NIESR and the Centre 
for Economic Performance at LSE)1 to a gain of four points (Minford, for Economists for Brexit2– a 
clear outlier) – see figure 1. 
o The main reason for the differences lies in the assumptions made about shifting from the 
current access that the UK has to the EU single market to a new regime in which the UK 
faces restrictions.  
o As well as assumptions, there are methodological disagreements about analytic techniques. 
When examined by the group of economists, the conclusion was that the approach adopted 
by Minford stands out from all the others and was considered to be the most questionable. 
Unsurprisingly Minford is equally critical of his critics. 
o The scenarios least damaging to the UK interest are those that involve the fewest 
restrictions on the UK’s access to the EU, including being closest to the status quo of EU 
membership, whereas those that result in new barriers to UK trade or inward investment 
are the most damaging. 
 
The macroeconomic effects of Brexit: short-term 
 There is a consensus, even including proponents of ‘leave’, that there would be a short-term 
negative shock to the EU economy from Brexit. 
o However, there is clear disagreement about the likely duration of this effect and whether it 
would have only immediate limited costs or have permanent consequences. 
o The two main reasons for this short-term effect, explained notably by the Treasury3, are 
that the uncertainty surrounding the outcome of the referendum has deterred investment 
and that there would be transitional costs of shifting to a new regime for trade and 
investment. 
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o Other short-term effects could derive from currency volatility and financial market 
reactions. The Bank of England4, in particular, has warned that Brexit could result in 
financial instability that could have damaging macroeconomic effects because of the 
financial openness of the UK. 
Jobs 
 To the extent that there is a loss of GDP, it will also, in macroeconomic terms, mean a lower level of 
employment in the UK economy.  
 Demand from other EU countries constitutes around 12% of final demand for UK goods and services 
and this translates into around 3.3 million jobs.  
o It does not, as some campaigners wrongly imply, mean that those jobs are necessarily at 
risk from Brexit. 
o Nevertheless, there are some sectors of activity in which job losses are likely, and others 
where Brexit could see an increase in jobs, in both cases depending on what replaces the 
current arrangements. Some job losses are likely in the City of London, as many of its 
representatives have made clear, while major exporters (such as the manufacturers of cars) 
could be forced to retrench if obstacles to exporting to the EU increase. 
o Equally, there are some import competing industries which can be expected to see job 
increases if exit from the EU means that they become more competitive, either because a 
new trade regime raises the costs of imports or because they can then avoid regulations 
that impair their competitiveness.  
 The UK economy has become increasingly reliant on the service sector, both as the main engine of 
job creation and as a source of export demand. Between 1997 and 2013, according to ONS data on 
final demand5, the proportion of services in total UK exports rose from 28% to 41%, with rapid 
growth in key service activities, such as financial and business services. These sectors are now as 
important to the overall UK export effort as the major manufacturing sectors of cars, aerospace, 
computers & electronics and pharmaceuticals. 
o It follows that the outlook for UK access to export markets in services will be crucial for 
future job creation: the digital and creative industries have been identified in various 
studies as especially important. These are UK priorities for extending the single market, but 
progress in this direction might lose momentum if the UK leaves. 
 The regional distribution of jobs could be influenced by shifts in the destination of foreign direct 
investment into the UK, a pattern already seen following the 2008/9 recession when Wales, 
Northern Ireland and the more northerly English regions lost ground. 
The public finances 
 The direct effect of Brexit on the public finances will be to allow the UK to save on its current 
payments into the EU budget.  
 Any savings from direct contributions to the EU budget would be erased if Brexit results in a GDP 
loss of as little as one percentage point and the public finances would be worse if the loss were 
greater, despite no longer paying into the EU. 
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 Based on the 2014 data most often quoted, the saving would be around £280 million per week, not 
the £350 million so often claimed, because what the UK ‘sends to Brussels’ is an amount from which 
the UK rebate has already been deducted. Using the hypothetical gross payment figure is 
misleading. On the most generous assumptions, only the lower figure of £280 million would be 
available to spend on the NHS or other priorities. 
o Some groups in the UK, notably farmers and universities that succeed in obtaining research 
grants from EU programmes, would potentially lose from Brexit.  
o Parts of the UK that benefits from EU regional policy would also lose fiscally: the most 
affected are West Wales & the Valleys and Cornwall & the Isles of Scilly. 
o It would be an open question for a post Brexit UK government whether (as has been hinted 
at by Leave campaigners) to replace these various flows, amounting to some £6 billion per 
year (around £115 per week), with domestic spending. 
The economic effects of migration 
 Migration from the EU (as opposed to refugees from beyond the EU, analytically a very different 
phenomenon, with little to do with EU membership) can have both positive and negative economic 
effects.  
 There is little doubt that the inflow of labour from the EU has had a beneficial effect on the supply 
of labour and that many public services, in particular, rely on EU workers.  EU citizens of working 
age are significantly more likely to be in employment than their indigenous counterparts and make 
a positive contribution to the UK’s public finances. 
o Despite the often quoted statement by Stuart Rose of the Britain Stronger in Europe 
campaign, there is no statistical support for the proposition that the inflow of EU migrants 
has resulted in lower wage levels. 
o Migrants from some origins do remit some of their income to their home countries and this 
can be regarded as a loss for the UK economy. 
 In some localities, migration undoubtedly puts pressure on public services and housing.  
Who is likely to gain or lose overall? 
 There may well be opportunities for the UK to cut costly regulations, although some of the amounts 
claimed exaggerate the likely benefits.  
o However, it is too easily forgotten that regulation also has benefits and, that, contrary to 
the general image, an absence of regulation can also be costly, whether for consumers or, 
in some instances, businesses.  
o In some instances the UK has chosen to ‘gold-plate’ regulations making them more onerous 
than required by EU rules. 
 International organisations, such as the IMF and the OECD6 have warned that the balance of risks 
for the UK economy is negative and will have lasting effects. 
o These International organisations have also highlighted the likely adverse consequences for 
EU partner countries and the prospect that Brexit could be a negative shock for the global 
economy, derailing its fragile recovery from the crises of recent years. 
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o Similar sentiments were expressed by Federal Reserve Chair, Jan7et Yellen8. 
 There is considerable uncertainty around who would gain or lose domestically from Brexit, again 
depending on the contours of whatever new economic governance framework replaces EU 
membership. The outcome could differ according to locality, region, social group or sector of 
employment, among many possible cleavages. There are indications that Brexit could accentuate 
inequality: for example, research by the NIESR suggests the burden of Brexit would fall more heavily 
on low-income households. 
 Macroeconomic data can be hard to relate to individual circumstances: when all is said is done, 





Figure 1 ‘Funnel’ chart of post-Brexit projections  
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